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THE TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS SELECTIVE WAIVER:
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION
NANCY

J. GEGENHEIMERt

INTRODUCTION

On June 19, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decided In re Qwest Communications International, Inc.' Accepting a Writ of Mandamus, 2 the court declared that the writ, "presents

an issue of first impression in this Circuit, namely, whether Qwest
waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, as to
third-party civil litigants, by releasing privileged materials to federal
agencies in the course of the agencies' investigation of Qwest.",3 During
the course of investigations by the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), Qwest
had turned over approximately 200,000 privileged documents "pursuant
'4

to a written confidentiality agreement between Qwest and each agency.
Those documents, in turn, had been introduced into evidence in criminal
trials, produced in three separate criminal proceedings, and used as exhibits in SEC investigative testimony.

In upholding the district court, which had in turn upheld the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the Tenth Circuit joined the majority of other circuits 6 in refusing to allow a selective disclosure of privileged or work-product documents without the resulting waiver of the
privilege or protection.7
In a 2005 Seton Hall Law Review article, the author, Andrew
McNally, argued for the revitalization of the selective waiver to encour-

t
Nancy Gegenheimer is a partner with Holme Roberts & Owen LLP. She received her
B.A. from the University of Colorado, 1975; and J.D. from the University of Denver, 1978.
1. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S.Ct. 584 (Nov. 13, 2006).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 165 1(a) (West 2007).
3. Qwest, 450F.3dat 1181.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1194.
6. In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307 (6th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 688 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt
Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. The Republic of the
Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991); The Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
7.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1200.
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age voluntary disclosure of corporate wrongdoing. 8 As of May 15, 2006,
the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules submitted proposed new
evidence Rule 502.9 Proposed Rule 502(c) addresses selective waiver. 10
This article first lays out the history of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. Secondly, it sets out the landscape of the
government agency policies informing Qwest's actions, and thirdly, it
discusses the case law on selective disclosure starting with the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in DiversifiedIndustries,Inc. v. Meredith." This article then discusses the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Qwest and the proposed
new evidence Rule 502 and concludes with a discussion of what lies
ahead for selective waiver of the privilege.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges known to
common law. 12 Initially, the privilege worked only one way, prohibiting
attorneys from revealing their client's secrets. 13 But the privilege quickly
expanded to communications that went either way between lawyers and
clients.14 The scope of the privilege is "governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience."' 5 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("FRE 501") provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be govemed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or

8.
Andrew J. McNally, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure Of
Corporate Wrongdoing By Restricting Third-PartyAccess To Disclosed Materials, 35 SETON HALL
L. REV. 823, 844 (2005).
9. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
10.
FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed Draft 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
ExcerptEV Report Pub.pdf#page=4.
11.
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
12.
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888).
13.
See Berd v. Lovelace, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch.).
14.
Boltonv. Corporation of Liverpool, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 614, 615 (Ch.); THE
HONORABLE DICK THORNBURGH, WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A BALANCED
APPROACH, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 6 n.8 (2006).

15.

FED. R. EVID. 501; United States v. Zolia, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
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political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with
16
state law.

The Federal Rules of Evidence are statutory in nature because they
"were passed by both houses [of Congress] and signed into law by the
President."' 17 This differs from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which were promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.' 8 A rule on
privilege cannot be made effective through the ordinary rulemaking
process. Congress must
enact such a rule through its authority under the
9
Commerce Clause.'

The attorney-client privilege provides that:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
adviser in his capacity as such (3) the communications relating to that
purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure 2by
himself or his
0
legal adviser (8) except if the protection be waived.

The purpose of the privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice."'2 The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon lawyers being fully informed by their clients. 22 The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts,23 and the purpose
of the communication must be for legal advice. 4
There are complications in the application of the privilege when the
client is a corporation because the corporation is an artificial creature and
16. FED. R. EvID. 501.
17.
Act of Jan. 2 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (establishing an appendix for
rules of evidence); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism andFederalRule ofEvidence 501: Privilege and
Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1788 (1994).
18.
See Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 264 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West 2007)).
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2007).
20. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683, 684 (1st Cir. 1997); accord 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (providing the "privilege applies only if(I) the asserted
holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar or a court or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client; (b) without the presence of strangers; (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law; or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings and not (a) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (iv) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client").
21.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
22.
See id.
23.
See id. at 395.
24.
See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1970); In re Natta, 264 F. Supp.
734, 741 (D. Del. 1967); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Co., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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not an individual.25 Nonetheless, there is no question that the privilege
applies when the client is a corporation. 26 One difficulty with the privilege when it relates to a corporation is determining whether or not the
communication is actually between an attorney and a client for purposes
of legal advice.2 7 In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation confronting modem corporations, corporations, unlike most
individuals, constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.28
The privilege is also difficult in the corporate context because the restriction on privilege is that it must be legal advice, not business advice.2 9
The privilege belongs to the corporation, not to individuals.3 °
This difficulty in applying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting is reflected in the nearly twenty-year period wherein the
courts struggled with the control group test and who, in fact, was entitled
to claim a privileged communication. 1 In 1981, the Supreme Court took
the issue up and recognized, citing ethical considerations, that a lawyer
must be fully informed of the facts and must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.2
The Court explained, "In a corporation it may be necessary to glean information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or nonmanagement personnel. 3 3
But all testimony exclusionary rules, including the attorney-client
privilege, contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right
to every person's evidence.34 As a result, privileges are strictly construed
and only accepted to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascer-

25.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-90.
26.
See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963); Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389-90 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915)).

27.
See Meredith, 572 F.2d at 608.
28.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (citing Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the CorporateArena, 24 BUs. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).
29.
See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
30.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
31.
See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389-90.
32.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 391-93.
33.
Id. at 391 (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
34.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950); In re Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 F.3d 16, 22
(1st Cir. 2003).
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taining the truth.35 The privilege is not limitless and courts take care to
36
apply it only to the extent necessary to achieve its underlying goals.
A party who invokes the privilege has the burden of establishing
that it applies to the communication at issue.37 That party also has the
burden to prove that it has not been waived. 38 Just like the attorneyclient privilege, questions of waiver of privilege are governed by federal
common law.39
The attorney-client privilege can be waived expressly and impliedly, and both are equally binding.4 ° Professor Weinstein explains:
[T]he courts have identified a common denominator in waiver by implication. In each case, the party asserting the privilege placed protected information in issue for personal benefit through some affirmative act, and the Court found that to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure
of that information would have been unfair to
41
the opposing party.
A client impliedly waives the privilege when the client (1) testifies concerning a portion of an attorney-client communication; (2) places attorney-client relationship itself at issue; or (3) asserts reliance on advice of
counsel as an element of a claim or defense. 42 On the other hand, express waivers include: (1) express and voluntary surrender of the privilege; (2) partial disclosure of a privileged document; (3) selective disclosure to some outsiders but not all; or (4) inadvertent over-hearings or
disclosures.4 3
When a party defends its actions by disclosing an attorney-client
communication, it waives the attorney-client privilege as to all such
communications regarding the same subject matter. 44 But an extrajudicial disclosure, not used to gain adversarial advantage in judicial proceedings is not an implied waiver of all communications on the same

35. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (arguing that the benefit behind the
exclusionary rule is the public good of deterring police misconduct which outweighs the traditional
principles of using all available evidence in seeking the truth).
36. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001).
37. See United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1972).
38.
See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bollin, 264 F.3d 391,412 (4th Cir. 2001).
39.
See United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1998).
40.
The Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41.

3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503-

41 [1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin Ed. 1977); cf Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 22.
42. Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 24.
43.
United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (citing MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, § 93 at 341-48 (J.W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
44. See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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subject. 45 There are other well-established waivers, not involved in
Qwest.

46

II. WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The work product doctrine is a protection, not a privilege.47 It has
its genesis in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,48 decided in 1947. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which protects all
types of communications, both oral and written, the work-product doctrine protects documents and tangible things that are both privileged and
non-privileged if prepared in anticipation of litigation. 49 The workproduct doctrine is now codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule provides:
Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this Rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this Rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the Court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an50attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.

The rule specifically protects against disclosure of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Thus, the work-product
45.
Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 24.
46.
Other waivers include a crime-fraud exception. See Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155,
162 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)) ("All reasons for the attorney-client privilege are completely eviscerated when a client consults an attorney not for advice on
past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud.");
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1997). Another exception is joint defense or communications with codefendants. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. The Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424
(3d Cir. 1991). Another exception not at issue is when a disclosure to a third party is necessary for
the client to obtain informed legal advice. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1424. By
Qwest's admission at oral argument, inadvertent disclosure was not an issue. In re Qwest
Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 584
(Nov. 13, 2006); accord Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (permitting some disclosure of confidential information without resulting in an inadvertent waiver).
47.
Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J.
917 (1983).
48.
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
49.
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 432 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Echo
Star Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
50.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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doctrine encourages attomeys to write down their thoughts and opinions
with the knowledge that their opponents will not be able to rob them of
the fruits of their labor. 51 "The purpose of the doctrine is to establish a
zone of privacy for strategic litigation planning and52 to prevent one party
from piggybacking on the adversary's preparation."
The work has to be prepared in anticipation of litigation, but actual
litigation does not have to be filed, in fact, it does not even have to be
true litigation. 53 For example, a summons from a department of the government qualifies as anticipation of litigation. 54 The courts recognize
that prudent parties anticipate litigation and begin preparation prior to the
time a suit is formally commenced. The test that is applied is "whether,
in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared for or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation." 55 But there is no workproduct protection for documents prepared in the regular course of business, or to satisfy public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other
non-litigation purposes, even if those documents are prepared while liti6
gation is a prospect or ongoing.
Like the attorney-client privilege, there are strong policies behind
the work-product doctrine.5 7 The attorney-client privilege protects the
attorney-client relationship and the legal system, and the work-product
doctrine is said to protect the adversary system. 58 In some respects, the
work-product doctrine is not only different, but it is also broader than the
attorney-client privilege. 59 The protection given work product by the
Rule is broader in the sense that it may be, but need not be, work of an
attorney, and work product is not confined to information or materials
gathered or assembled by an attorney.
Hickman v. Taylor distinguished between opinion and non-opinion
work product and this distinction is followed in the Rule. 60 "[A] showing
of necessity is sufficient to overcome" the work-product protection when
documents "do not contain opinion work product, i.e., writings which

51.
52.

See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11; Echo Star Commc'ns, 448 F.3d at 1301.
United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995).

53.
See In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1993) (providing that the "presence
of an adversarial relationship does not depend on the existence of litigation").
54. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (Internal Revenue Service
summons is anticipation of litigation).
55.

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 8 FEDERAL

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2017, 2021-28 (West 2006); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590,
593 (6th Cir. 2006).
56. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 55, § 2024; Roxworthy, 457 F.3d at 593.
57. E.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-37 (1975).
58. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir.
1991).
59. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th
Cir. 2002).
60. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-512.
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reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.'
Likewise, the rules as to waiver of work product differ
slightly from attorney-client privilege.62 Not every disclosure of work
product necessitates a waiver. Instead, the disclosure must be to an adversary. Courts distinguish disclosure of work product to adversaries
and non-adversaries.6 3
Thus, waiver of work product will occur if there is a disclosure to
an adversary, 64 and similar privilege waivers, 65 such as the crime-fraud
waiver, also apply to work product. 66 Because the waiver of attorneyclient privilege and work-product protection differs, there are cases
where the same conduct resulted in a waiver of the privilege but not
work product.6 7
III. FACTUAL SETTING OF

QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CASE

In early 2002, the SEC began investigating Qwest's business practices.6 8 In the summer of 2002, Qwest learned that the DOJ had also
commenced a criminal investigation of Qwest. 69 In those investigations,
Qwest produced 220,000 pages of documents that were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.70 Qwest also withheld 390,000 pages of privileged documents.71
Prior to the initiation of the federal investigations, the plaintiffs had
filed civil actions against Qwest that involved many of the same issues as
the investigation.72 In the civil cases, Qwest produced millions of pages
of documents, but withheld all of the privileged documents, including

61.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1431.
62.
See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681,687 (1stCir. 1997).
63.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 951 F.2d at 1428; see also Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 687;
Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. Billing Practices, 293 F.3d at 305-06.
64. In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90
(E.D.N.Y. 1981)); Grumman Aerospace Corp., 91 F.R.D. at 90; Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l
Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 (D.D.C. 1984).
65.
See supra note 46.
66.
In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Int'l Sys. & Controls
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cit. 1980); Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236; In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1375 (D. C. Cir. 1984); Picard Chemical Inc. Profit Sharing
Plan, 951 F. Supp. 679, 689 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Shields v. Sturm, Roger& Co., 864 F.2d 379, 383
(5th Cir. 1989); In re Martin-Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624-26 (4th Cir. 1988).
68. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181(1Oth Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 584 (Nov. 13, 2006).
69.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1181.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72. Id. at 1182.
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those that it had produced to the SEC and the DOJ.73
Qwest disclosed
74
the withheld documents on a privilege log, as it must.
Qwest had a written agreement with the SEC to maintain the confidentiality of the documents and to not disclose them to any third party,
except to the extent staff determines that disclosure is otherwise required
by law or would be in furtherance of the SEC discharge of its duties and
responsibilities. 75 But Qwest agreed that the DOJ could share the documents with other state, local and federal agencies and that the DOJ could
make direct or derivative use of the documents in any proceeding and in
its investigation.76 The DOJ agreed to maintain the confidentiality and
not disclose the documents to third parties except to the extent that the
DOJ determined that disclosure was otherwise required by law or would
be in furtherance of the DOJ's discharge of its duties and responsibilities.77 The confidentiality agreements with both the DOJ and the SEC
were in writing. 78 But the documents, given the scope of the DOJ's permission, were introduced into evidence in criminal trials, were produced
in discovery in three separate criminal proceedings, and used as exhibits
to SEC investigative testimony. 79 The DOJ was not required to file these
documents under seal, keep a record of
how they were used or to deal
80
with the documents in any special way.
Private parties in civil litigation found the documents identified on
privileged logs and moved to compel. 81 The Magistrate Judge held that
Qwest had waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection by producing the documents. 82 The District Court upheld the Magistrate Judge's order compelling production and required further production of certain reports prepared by Qwest's counsel, redacted of attorney
opinion work product. 83 The order to disclose the redacted version of
counsel's report was not challenged in the Tenth Circuit.84 The85 district
court stayed its order pending outcome of the writ of mandamus.

73.

Id.

74. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1984) (providing that a party seeking to assert the privilege must make a clear showing that it applies); FED. R.
CV. P. 26(b)(5); FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
75. SeeQwest, 450F.3dat 1181.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1181-82.
78.
Id. at 1181.
79. Id. at 1194.
80. Id.
81.
See id. at 1182.
82. Id. There was no issue of inadvertent disclosure or involuntary waiver in the Qwest case.
Id. Also, there was no issue of waiver of opinion work product. Id.
83.
Id.at 1182.
84. See id
85. Id.
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IV. LANDSCAPE REGARDING FEDERAL AGENCIES' POLICIES FACED BY

QWEST

At the time that the DOJ and the SEC began investigations of
Qwest, there were years of precedent where corporations waived the
privilege to either: (1) not be labeled uncooperative; or (2) secure leniency during an investigation. Both the DOJ and the SEC have written
policies regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege.
A. Departmentof Justice
The DOJ has a corporate leniency policy for antitrust violations.86
With respect to leniency before any investigation has begun, the DOJ
policy includes, as one of its six conditions: "The corporation reports the
wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing
87
and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation."
With respect to all of its investigations, the DOJ is also guided by its
principles of Federal Prosecution of Corporations, which appeared in a
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder and provided
guidance to prosecutors about whether to prosecute a corporation.8 8 The
memorandum was not made public at the time that Deputy Attorney
General Holder issued it. The memorandum attaches guidelines titled
Department's Federal Prosecution of Corporations (the "Guidelines").89
The memorandum emphasizes that the factors laid out in the Guidelines
are not outcome determinative and are for guidance only. Prosecutors
are not required to reference the factors or document the weight they
accorded specific factors in reaching their decision. 90 In setting out factors to be considered in charging corporations, the Holder Memorandum
states that, in general, prosecutors should apply the same factors in determining whether to charge a corporation as they do with respect to individuals. 91 The Guidelines go on to state, however, that due to the nature of the corporate "person" some additional factors are present. 92 For
example, one of those factors is: "The Corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the cor-

86. See Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (August 10, 1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm.
87. Id. This is also a policy for individuals. See id.
88. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Eric Holder Jr. on Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corps. to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter
Holder Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.
html.
89. Id. [hereinafter Guidelines] ("Guidelines" refers to the Federal Prosecution of Corporation
guidelines attached to the Holder Memorandum).
90.
See Holder Memorandum, supra note 88.
91.
See Guidelines, supra note 89, § I.A.
92. Id.
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porate attorney-client and work product privileges (see section VI, in-

fa)y93

Section VI of the Guidelines then addresses whether a corporation's
voluntary disclosure was sufficient. 94 The section discusses the importance of the completeness of disclosure and that it will be a factor
95
weighed in assessing the adequacy of the corporation's cooperation.
The disclosure may include waiver of attorney-client and work-product
protections with respect to its internal investigation and its communications with its officers, directors, and employees of counsel. 96 The Guidelines provide that prosecutors may therefore request a waiver in appropriate circumstances. 97 The government recognized that waiver by the
corporation may be the only way the government could get the statements of possible witnesses, subjects, or targets.98 The Guidelines state:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect to its internal investigations and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors,
and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to
obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without
99
having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.
The Guidelines imply that the government may consider a corporation not cooperative if it enters into joint defense agreements with its
officers, directors or employees or continues to pay and advance their
attorneys' fees, unless required to do so by law, or otherwise supports
culpable employees.l 00
In a November 2003 interview published in the United States Attorneys Bulletin, United States Attorney James B. Comey stated that because of an individual's rights to invoke the Fifth Amendment, the internal investigation and notes of counsel during an internal investigation
may be the only way for the government to get to certain facts. 10 1 United
States Attorney Comey reiterated in this 2003 interview that:

93.
Id. § IL.A.4.
94.
See id. § VI.
95.
See id.
96.
Id. § VI.B.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99. Id.
100.
See id.
101.
See Interview by United States Attorneys Bulletin with James B. Comey, United States
Attorney, 51 United States Attorney Bulletin No. 6, 4-5 (November 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usab5106.pdf
(regarding Department of
Justice's policy on requesting corporations under criminal investigation to waive the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection).
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It is hard for me to understand why a corporation would ever enter
into a joint defense agreement because doing so may prevent it from
making disclosures it must make if it is in a regulated industry or
may wish to make to a prosecutor. In any event, how a joint defense
agreement will affect the corporation's ability to cooperate will vary
in every case. If the joint defense agreement puts the corporation in a
position where it is unable to make full disclosure about the criminal
activity, then no credit for cooperation will be factored into the government's charge and decision,
and it will get no credit for that coop10 2
eration under the guidelines.
Subsequent to the Holder Memorandum, in 2003 Deputy Attorney
10 3
General Larry D. Thompson issued the "Thompson Memorandum."
Attached to the memorandum were revisions to Holder's Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. The main focus of the
revisions, according to the Thompson Memorandum, is to increase emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation. 104 He notes that:
Too often business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with
a Department investigation, in fact takes steps to impede the quick
and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation. The revisions made clear that such conduct should
weigh in favor of a corporate prosecution. The revisions also address[ed] the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanisms in
place within a corporation, to ensure that these
measures are truly ef10 5
fective rather than a mere paper program[].
The revision that addresses this focus appears in Section VI of the
10 6
Thompson Memorandum, on collaboration and voluntary disclosure.
The revisions added that agreements for immunity or amnesty or pretrial
diversion may be entered into only with the approval of each affected
district or the appropriate department official.10 7 Another factor was
added into Section VI as follows:
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct that
impedes the investigation (whether or not rising to the level of criminal obstruction). Examples of such conduct include: overly broad
assertions of corporate representation of employees or former employees; inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such
102.
Id.at4.
103.
See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry D. Thompson on Principles of Fed.
Prosecution of Bus. Org. to Heads of Dep't Components United States Attorneys (June 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf.
104.
Id.at 1.
105.

Id.

106.

See id.at 6-8.

107.

Id.at6.
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as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the investigation
including, for example, the direction to decline to be interviewed;
making presentations or submissions that contain misleading assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and
failure to properly disclose illegal conduct known to the corpora-

tion. 108

The Thompson Memorandum would have been issued during the
investigations of Qwest. 10 9 The Justice Department sent out another
memorandum on October 21, 2005 from Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum Jr. which provided that, to ensure that federal
prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial discretion under the principles of the Thompson Memorandum, each district was directed to establish a written waiver review process. 11 The McCallum Memorandum
acknowledged the fact that waiver review processes may vary from district to district (or component to component) so that each United States
Attorney or Component retained the prosecutorial discretion necessary,
consistent with their circumstances, to seek timely, complete, and accurate information from business organizations."'
The Thompson Memorandum, like the Holder Memorandum, states
that a corporation's offer of cooperation does not automatically entitle
the corporation to immunity from prosecution. 12 It is merely one factor
considered in conjunction with other factors. In fact, a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and cooperation will not even assure that a corporation will be given any leniency. Prosecutors must and do retain wide
discretion in determining the charges to bring against a corporation and
waiver of the privilege is just one of the factors.' 13
The Thompson Memorandum came under strong criticism from the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Stein. 114 In Stein, the
district court found that provisions of the Thompson Memorandum relating to factors to weigh in determining whether the corporation appeared
to be protecting its employees and agents, including through advancing

108. Id. at 8.
Compare id. at 1 (noting the Thompson Memorandum was issued on January 20, 2003),
109.
with Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1181 (noting the SEC and DOJ investigations of Qwest began in the summer of 2002). In United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court held
that portions of the Thompson Memorandum were unconstitutional violations of due process under
the Fifth Amendment and the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Memorandum from Acting Deputy Att'y Gen. Robert D. McCullum, Jr., on Waiver of
110.
Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection to Heads of Dep't Components United
(November 2005) [hereinafter McCallum Memorandum], available at
States Attorneys
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/AttomrneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
111.
Id.
Compare Thompson Memorandum, supra note 103, at 1, with Holder Memorandum,
112.
supranote 88, § VI.

113.
114.

Thompson Memorandum, supranote 103, at 6.
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 363-65, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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attorneys' fees, were unconstitutional. 15 The court held that16 they violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
On December 12, 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty
issued new guidelines.' 17 In a memorandum to all Heads of Department
Components, Deputy Attorney General McNulty states that the new
memorandum supersedes and replaces guidance contained in the memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson entitled
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations," dated
January 20, 2003.118 However, as was the case when the Thompson
Memorandum supplanted the Holder Memorandum, much of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations remain the same.
What changed, however, was Section VII. 119 Section VII of the McNulty
Memorandum sets out specifics on how the value of cooperation will be
treated in charging a corporation. 2 °
The McNulty Memorandum expressly states that waiver of attorney-client and work-product protections is not a prerequisite to a finding
that a company has cooperated in the government's investigation. 21 The
McNulty Memorandum goes on to state, "However, a company's disclosure of privileged information may permit the government to expedite its
investigation .... A corporation's response to a government's request
for waiver of privilege may be considered in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's investigation.'' 122 The
McNulty Memorandum identifies two categories of information that can
be requested, seriatim, from a corporation. 123 Category I must be requested first and entails purely factual information, which may or may
not be privileged, relating to the underlying misconduct. 124 If the Category I purely factual information provides an incomplete basis to conduct
a thorough investigation, prosecutors may then request Category II information. 125 Category II information includes attorney-client communications or nonfactual attorney-work product. 126 Such information in-

115.
Id.
116.
Id.at 365.
117.
Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty on Principles of Fed. Prosecution
of Bus. Org. to Head of Department Components United States Attorneys (December 12, 2006)
[hereinafter
McNulty Memorandum],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/
mcnultymemo.pdf.
118. Id.at2.

119.

Id. at 7-12.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.

8, I1.
9-11.
9.
10.
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cludes "legal advice given to the corporation
before, during, and after the
127
underlying misconduct occurred.'

B. Securities and Exchange Commission

The SEC has its own rules, guidelines and criteria that will be considered if the SEC is to give credit for self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation. These are set forth in a release known as the
"Seaboard Report" which came out in 2001.128 Criteria No. 11 of the
Seaboard Report is footnoted with the statement that in some cases the
desire to provide information to the SEC staff may cause companies to
consider choosing not to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work
product protection and other privileges, protections, and exemptions with
respect to the SEC. Of the thirteen criteria, only Criteria No. 11 goes to
the company's cooperation. It provides:
Did the company promptly make available to our staff the results of
its review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the situation? Did the company identify possible violative
conduct and evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt
enforcement actions against those who violated the law? Did the
company produce a thorough and probing written report detailing the
findings of its review? Did the company voluntarily disclose information our staff did not directly request and otherwise might not
have uncovered? Did the company ask its employees to cooperate
with our
staff and make all reasonable efforts to secure such coopera129
tion?

Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 130 directed the SEC to enact
rules of professional responsibility for attorneys.' 31 These rules, as enacted, provide that with regard to the attorney-client privilege and work
127. Id.
128.
See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 2 1(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
129. Id.
130.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2007)).
131.
15 U.S.C.A. § 7245. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule (1)requiring an
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel
or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the
counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary,
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the
attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
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product doctrine, a lawyer is required to report "evidence of a material
violation,' 32 which is defined as "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material
violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."' 13 3 The Rule
then goes on to provide that the attorney is supposed to report such material violations up the ladder to the chief legal counsel or chief executive
officer. 134 The Rule instructs that confidential information can be disclosed by an attorney, to prevent commission of an illegal act that would
be likely to perpetrate a fraud on the SEC or could cause substantial injury to the financial or property interests of the issuer. 35 While much
broader rules had in the past been proposed, they were withdrawn. 36
The rules as enacted do not dramatically change the state of the law on
attorney to reveal
attorney-client privilege. Many states already allow 1an
37
confidential information to prevent a crime or fraud.
C. The Sarbanes-OxleyAct
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act") was signed into law by the
President on July 30, 2002.138 The Act makes sweeping changes to the
law applicable to public companies and their officers and directors. Its
provisions are wide ranging and far beyond the scope of this article.
With respect to attorney-client privilege, the SEC enacted professional
responsibility rules for attorneys appearing while practicing before the
SEC, as required by Section 307 of the Act. 139 These rules are discussed
above.
The Act also includes broad whistle-blowing provisions. Section 806 of the Act amends Title 18 of the United States Code to protect
employees of publicly traded companies against retaliation in fraud

17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2006).
132.
133.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2006).
134.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2006).
135.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i)-(iii) (2006).
136.
The SEC proposed a rule on selective waiver which read:
Where an issuer, through its attorney, shares with the Commission information related to
a material violation, pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, such sharing of information
shall not constitute a waiver of any otherwise applicable privilege or protection as to
other persons.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,706
(Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). In 1984, the SEC proposed to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to establish a selective waiver but the proposal was never taken up by
Congress. SEC Oversight and Technical Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,and Finance of The H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th

Cong. 51 (1984).
James W. Semple, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
137.
53 FDCC QuARTERLY 419, 432 (2003).
138.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2007)).
139.
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2006).
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cases.140 The Act also sets out a criminal provision for retaliation or any
harmful action, including interference with lawful employment or livelihood, against any person for providing to a law enforcement officer any
truthful information relating
to the commission or possible commission
14 1
of any Federal offense.
D. FederalSentencing Guidelines
A provision added to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 addressed waiver of the privilege. Section 8 C 2.5(g)(1) allowed for a fivepoint reduction in a corporation's culpability score if the defendant fully
cooperated in the investigation. 142 The final sentence of § 8 C 2.5(g)(1)
as of 2004 previously read: "Waiver of attorney-client privilege and
work product protection is not a prerequisite to reduction in culpability
score.., unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and
thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization." 43 Under pressure from many sources, including the American Bar
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others, the amendment was removed in April 2006.144
V. LEGAL PRECEDENT FACED BY QWEST

A. Tenth Circuit
At the time Qwest faced investigation by the DOJ and the SEC,
there was no Tenth Circuit precedent in support of selective waiver.
Tenth Circuit precedent followed the traditional rule of waiver upon disclosure. For example, United States v. Bernard145 was a criminal proceeding wherein the defendant had disclosed attorney advice to a third
party. 146 The court held any voluntary disclosure by the client is incon147
sistent with the attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege.
In 1990, in United States v. Ryans, 148 the Tenth Circuit reiterated that any
49
voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party waives the privilege. 1

140.
141.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2005).
18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (Supp. 2005).

142.
Vote by U.S. Sentencing Commission May Staunch Erosion of Attorney-Client Privilege,
90 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 418,419 (2006).
143.
Id.

144.
Change to Evidence Rule Would Allow Partial Waiver to Government Agencies, 22 LAW.
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 319 (2006).
145.
877 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir 1989).
146.
Bernard,877 F.2d at 1465.
147.
Id.(citing United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
987 (1987)).
148.
903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990).
149.
Ryans, 903 F.2d at 741 n.13.
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Likewise, as to work product protection, Tenth Circuit precedent
held that production of work-product
material to a non-adversary waives
50
the work product protection
B. Other Circuits
Limited waiver of attorney-client privilege was first recognized by
the Eighth Circuit in DiversifiedIndustries,Inc. v. Meredith. 5 ' Diversified Industries was under investigation by the SEC.' 52 The Board of Directors hired a law firm to conduct an investigation into the Company's
business practices when it was revealed that the Company may have
maintained a slush fund that was used to bribe purchasing agents.' 53 The
law firm undertook an investigation and reported the results to the Company's Board in a memorandum that summarized employee interviews,
analyzed accounting data, evaluated the conduct of certain employees,
drew conclusions as to the propriety of their conduct and made recommendations as to steps the company could take. 154 In its initial opinion,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the law firm had not been hired to render legal advice and therefore found that the materials, which civil litigants sought in subsequent civil litigation, were not privileged.' 55
The court also found the materials were not work product because
they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. 56 As such, the
Eighth Circuit determined that it did not have to deal with a claim of
waiver of the privilege as a result of the materials having been turned
1 57
over to the government during a governmental agency investigation.
The Eighth Circuit in its initial opinion noted that the waiver issue was a
serious one but need not be decided since the court had found the materials were not privileged. 5 8 The court went on to note:
[W]e would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of privileged material to a governmental agency in obedience to an agency
subpoena constitutes a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, including its use in subsequent private litigation in which the material
is sought to be used against the party which yielded it to the
agency.159

150.
See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th Cir.
2006); Foster v. Hill, 188 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999).
151.
572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
152. Diversifiedlndus., 572 F.2d at 611.
153.
Id. at 607.
154. Id. at 607-08.
155. Id. at 606.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 604.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 604 n.1.
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The Eighth Circuit reconsidered its opinion in en banc. 160 As to attorney-client privilege, the court found upon reconsideration, that the
memoranda prepared by counsel, corporate minutes and a letter that revealed the content of the memoranda prepared by counsel were indeed
privileged and that the privilege had not been waived when Diversified
turned its memorandum over to a governmental agency.' 6' The court
stated:
As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic
SEC investigation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the
privileged occurred. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co. v. Storek, 297
F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969), United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d
256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961). To
hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in
order to protect stockholders, potential
1 62
stockholders and customers.
The cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit in its en banc opinion
are not directly on point as to waiver.1 63 Bucks County Bank & Trust
Co. v. Storek,' 64 involved testimony given in a suppression hearing not
being admissible at a subsequent criminal trial. 65 United States v. Goodman 166 dealt with the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self67
incrimination in a subsequent criminal investigation.
As to the work-product protection sought for several non-privileged
documents, the court found that they were not
prepared in anticipation of
168
litigation and, therefore, were not protected.
Four years later the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered a limited waiver issue in The Permian Corp. v. United
States.1 69 In Permian, Occidental Petroleum Corporation and its subsidiary, the Permian Corporation, were involved in litigation with respect to
70
Occidental's proposed exchange offer for shares of Mead Corporation.
Millions of documents were produced and Occidental and Mead had an

160.
161.

Id.at 606.
Id. at 611.

162.

Id.

163.
Diversified was dealing with selective waiver which is to waive the privilege as to some
parties and not others. Courts distinguish this from partial disclosure which is to waive as to some
documents but not all. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423
n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).
164.
297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969).
165.
Buck County Bank & Trust Co., 297 F. Supp. at 1123.
166.
289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
167.
Goodman, 289 F.2d at 257.
168.
See id. at 262.
169.
665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
170.
Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1215.
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agreement that there would not be an 17inadvertent waiver if a privileged
document was inadvertently produced. 1
Meanwhile, Occidental was involved with the SEC trying to get approval of its registration statement. 172 As part of that process, Occidental
agreed that the SEC could have documents that had been produced to
Mead.173 Once again, there were agreements that the documents may
contain privileged information and they would not be delivered to any
persons other than the SEC or SEC staff, but the agreements appeared to
grant the SEC the right to turn the documents over to other governmental
agencies after notice to Occidental.174 Even though the letters were not
explicit about the SEC being forbidden to release the information to
other governmental agencies, counsel for Occidental had indicated that
there was such an oral understanding. 175 Seven of the documents produced were attorney-client
privilege and twenty-nine were protected as
76
work product.
Thereafter, the Department of Energy sought to get the same documents that the SEC had received, including the seven documents that
were protected by attorney-client privilege and twenty-nine that were
protected as attorney work product. 77 While there seemed to be some
disagreement over what exactly was Occidental's arrangement with the
SEC regarding their use of the documents, the court's analysis was that
there was no dispute that the documents had indeed been turned over for
the SEC's use.' 78 The Circuit found that the mantel of confidentiality
had been breached
and an effective waiver of the privilege had been ac79
complished. 1
As to attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Circuit declined to adopt
the Diversified selective waiver, finding that the limited waiver would
not serve the interests underlying common law privilege for confidential
communications between an attorney and a client, stating "[t]he client
cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving
the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications180whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit."

171.
172.

Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1216.

173.
174.

Id.
See id.

175.
176.

Id. at 1217.
Id.

177.

Id.

178.
See id. at 1217-18.
179.
Id. at 1220. As with the Qwest case, there was no question of inadvertent disclosure since
Occidental had authorized disclosure by Mead to the SEC. See id. at 1219.
180.
Id. at 1221.
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Because the corporation had turned the documents over to the SEC
but was resisting disclosure to the Department of Energy, the court took
the opportunity to state that it was unaware of any congressional directive or judicially-recognized priority system that places a higher value on
cooperation with the SEC than cooperation with other regulatory agencies stating:
Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a
laudable activity, but it is hard to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship. If the client feels the need to
keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free to
do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege,
181
even when the discovery request comes from a "friendly" agency.
As to work product, with little analysis the court upheld the district
couit's finding of no waiver with respect to the work-product documents.
The court, citing United States v. AT&T, noted a more liberal standard
applicable to waiver of the work-product doctrine as opposed to the strict
standard of waiver for attorney-client privilege:
The attorney-client privilege exists to protect confidential communications, to assure the client that any statements he makes in seeking
legal advice will be kept strictly confidential between him and his attorney; in effect, to protect the attorney-client relationship. Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent
with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.
By contrast, the work product privilege does not exist to protect a
confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary system
by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the
discovery attempts of the opponent .... A disclosure made in the
pursuit of such trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should be allowed without waiver of
the privilege. We conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a
voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, it82should not suffice in itself
for waiver of the work product privilege.
In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia again rejected selective waiver, regardless of whether there
were
83
confidentiality agreements in place with the government agency.'

181.
182.

Id
Id. at 1219 (citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (em-

phasis and footnotes omitted). See generally WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 2327;
EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 93 (2d ed.

1972).
183.

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:3

The following year the Second Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit. 84 In
In re John Doe Corp., the company was under investigation for, amongst
other things, bribing governmental officials.185 The privileged document,
an investigatory memorandum titled Business Ethics Review ("BER"),
had not been shown to a governmental agency but instead to underwriter's counsel to assure the underwriter's counsel there were no merits
to claims of illegal bribes, ostensibly because there was no mention of an
illegal bribe of a governmental official in the BER. 186 It was this silence
that the Second Circuit considered a waiver once the BER was shown to
underwriter's counsel. 87 The company argued for a selective waiver due
to "the legal duty of due diligence and the millions of dollars riding on
the public offering of registered securities. ' 88 The Second Circuit was
unmoved:
We view this argument with no sympathy whatsoever. A claim that a
need for confidentiality must be respected in order to facilitate the
seeking and rendering of informed legal advice is not consistent with
selective disclosure when the claimant decides that
the confidential
89
purposes.1
beneficial
other
to
put
be
can
materials
The next circuit to address selective waiver was the Fourth Circuit.' 90 The Fourth Circuit had previously refused to embrace the concept of selective waiver created in Diversified.191 As to attorney-client
privilege, the court in Martin Marietta said, "[I]f a client communicates
information to his attorney with the understanding that the information
will be revealed to others, that information as well as the details underlying the data.., will not enjoy the privilege."' 192 In Martin Marietta, the
court was really addressing the issue of subject matter waiver rather than
selective waiver. Martin Marietta sought to limit the waiver to documents actually disclosed to the government rather than implying waiver
to all materials on the same subject as those provided to the government.' 93 But the court found there was waiver as to the entire subject.194
As for work product, the court noted a broader protection for work
product, but held that a waiver as to some work product will waive the
184.
185.
186.
187.

In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 489.

188.

Id.

189.
Id. (noting that use of the fact of an investigation to allay the concerns of third parties
about possible criminal acts, to create the appearance of compliance with laws requiring disclosure,
or to cover up a crime disclosed through protected communication in the course of the investigation
will cause the corporation to lose the privilege).
190.
In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
191.
See United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979).

192.

Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 623 (citing (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 875).

193.
194.

Id.
Id.
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entire subject matter. 95 The court also held that there was subject matter
96
waiver of non-opinion work product but not of opinion work product,'
deciding an
issue it had previously left open in Duplar Corp. v. Deering
97
Milliken.'
The next circuit to deal with the selective waiver issue was the
Third Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. The Republic of the Philippines.198 Westinghouse had disclosed documents relating to an internal
investigation regarding possible bribes of foreign officials. 199 The documents had been turned over to the SEC during an SEC investigation. 0 0
When the Republic of the Philippines later sued Westinghouse, alleging
it had obtained a government contract in the Philippines through bribes,
the civil litigants sought all the documents that had been turned over to
the SEC.2 °t The Third Circuit found that Westinghouse had waived both
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product protection.20 2 Westinghouse had turned over several reports generated during investigations
by the SEC and the DOJ.2 °3 The court found that this turnover effectuated a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to subsequent
civil litigation.2°
The court found that selective waiver does not have anything to do
with the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege, which is to
protect the confidentiality of attorney-client communications in order to
encourage clients to obtain informed legal assistance. 20 5 The court reviewed the only known exceptions to waiver despite a disclosure: (1) for
co-defendants or (2) disclosure to an agent necessary to obtain informed
advice and found that each of these continued to promote the purposes
behind the privilege.20 6 The Third Circuit found that a selective waiver,
designed to encourage corporations to undertake internal investigations,
does not serve any purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance.20 7
In fact, the Third Circuit opined that a whole new privilege was being sought and was not persuaded that a new privilege was necessary to
encourage corporations to cooperate with the government.2 8 The court
noted that no such privilege had been created as of the time corporations,
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625-26.
540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1417.
Id.
Id.
Id.at1418.
Id.at1417.
Id.at1418.
Id. at 1424.
Id.; see also supra note 46.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1425.
Id.
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like Westinghouse, were cooperating with the government in its various
agency investigations. 209
Likewise, the Third Circuit found that Westinghouse waived the
work-product protection for work-product documents by turning them
over to the SEC and the DOJ. 210 The court held:
When a party discloses protected materials to a government agency
investigating allegations against it, it uses those materials to forestall
prosecution (if the charges are unfounded) or to obtain lenient treatment (in the case of well-founded allegations). These objectives,
however rational,211
are foreign to the objectives underlying the workproduct doctrine.

The next circuit to address selective waiver was the Second Circuit
in In re Steinhardt Partners.212 Steinhardt Partners addressed only
waiver of work-product documents. In Steinhardt Partners, the company was alleged to have manipulated the market for two-year treasury
notes.21 3 In civil litigation relating to this same conduct, the company
withheld a memorandum prepared by its attorneys and previously given
to the SEC.2 14 The memorandum had been solicited by the SEC during
the investigation of the company and while there was a pending threat of
an enforcement action. 2 5 There was no agreement that the SEC would
maintain confidentiality of the memorandum.
The Second Circuit rejected Steinhardt's attempt to use the workproduct protection to sustain this unilateral use of a work-product memorandum containing counsel's legal theories which had been voluntarily
submitted to an investigatory body.216 The court stated, "[W]e agree that
selective assertion of privilege should not be merely another brush on an
attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic
advantage. '' 21 7 The court said the same rationale used for attorney-client
cases on selective privilege applied, citing
privilege and work-product2 18
Permianand Westinghouse.
But in rejecting Steinhardt's plea for selective waiver in this case,
the Second Circuit declined to adopt a per se rule and held that
"[c]rafting rules relating to privilege in matters of governmental investigations must be done on a case-by-case basis. ,2 1 9 The court implied that
209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 1429.

211.

Id.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
SteinhardtPartners,9 F.3d at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id.; Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428.
SteinhardtPartners,9 F.3d at 236.
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if a written agreement had been in place, that would have been a consid22
eration. 0
Four years later, the First Circuit rejected any selective waiver in
United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.22 1 Pursuant to
contract between MIT and the Department of Defense, MIT had submitted certain billing statements to the defense contract audit agency. 222 In a
subsequent IRS investigation as to MIT's tax-exempt status, the IRS
sought the same documents.223 MIT initially redacted the documents for
attorney-client privilege and work-product material. 2 4 The IRS then
sought to get the redacted information from the defense contract audit
agency.2 5 The IRS went to the district court to enforce its subpoena, and
the district court held that the disclosure of the legal bills to the audit
agency forfeited the attorney-client privilege.22 6 Rejecting various arguments, including an argument that MIT had to make these kinds of disclosures in order to become a government defense contractor, the First
Circuit held, "[A]nyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document
to a third party, or does so pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has7 an incentive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvan22
tage.
As to a work-product privilege, however, the First Circuit followed
prior case law and held that the work-product protection is not as easily
waived as the attorney-client privilege.2 28 The court found that disclosure to the audit agency was disclosure to a potential adversary because
there was a potential for controversy and even a potential for litigation.2 29
While undoubtedly MIT hoped to avoid that controversy, it was still disclosure to an adversary.2 3 °
The Federal Circuit has not recognized limited waiver and refused
to do so under the facts
in Genentech, Inc. v. United States International
23 1
Trade Commission.
In 2002, The Sixth Circuit rejected selective wqiver in In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation.232 Privileged
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683 (1st Cir. 1997).
Mass. Inst. ofTech., 129 F.3d at 682-83.

224.

Id. at 683.

225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 686.

228.
Id.at 687 & n.6 (citing WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 55, § 2024); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428-29; Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 234-35; In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1371-75; Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 625; In re Chrysler Motors
Corp. Overnight Eval. Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1988)).
229.
Mass. Inst. ofTech., 129 F.3d at 687.
230.
Id. at 686.
231.
122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
232.
293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
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documents had been provided to the DOJ and other government agencies.233 These documents were sought thereafter in civil litigation.234
After a thorough review of the state of the law, the court summarized the
following: (1) cases where selective waiver was permissible; 235 (2) cases
where selective waiver was permissible in situations where government
agrees to a confidentiality order;236 and (3) cases where selective waiver
was rejected under any situation.237 After consideration, the Sixth Circuit
238
rejected the concept of selective waiver, in all of its various forms.
C. District Court Opinions
Several district courts have held that disclosure to governmental
agencies does not waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege.
Most notably for Qwest, the District of Colorado had adopted one of the
exceptions for a waiver.
In 1993, in M&L Business Machines, Inc., the district court in Colorado found a limited waiver in circumstances wherein the party makes a
contemporaneous reservation or stipulation that it does not intend to
waive the privilege and makes some effort to preserve the privacy of the
privilege. 239 The district court in M&L Business Machines discussed the
state of the law of selective waiver of attorney-client privilege and acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the issue.2 40 The
district court held that because the Bank of Boulder, in cooperating with
the government in its investigation of M&L Business Machines, had
provided privileged material but had reserved the right to assert the privilege in other proceedings, it had not waived the privilege.24'
The approach adopted by the District of Colorado came from
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock
BroadcastingCo. 242 In that case, Shamrock had turned over documents
to the SEC in response to subpoenas and had not entered into any confidentiality agreements with the SEC.243 The court held that if the documents had been turned over under a protective order, stipulation or other

233.
In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp., 293 F.3d at 292.
234.
Id. at 293.
235.
Id. at 295 (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc)).
236.
Jobin v. Bank of Boulder (M&L Bus. Mach., Inc.), 161 B.R. 689, 695-96 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1993) (citing Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).

237.
PernianCorp., 665 F.2d at 1221, In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 489; Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1426, SteinhardtPartners,9 F.3d at 236.
238.
In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp., 293 F.3d at 302.
239.
M&L Bus. Mach., 161 B.R. at 695-96.
240.
Id. at 696.
241.
Id. at 696-97.
242.
521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
243.
Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. at 639.
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express reservation of the producing parties' claim of privilege as to244the
material disclosed, there would be no waiver in subsequent litigation.
Notably in the districts that have not decided the selective waiver issue, the Seventh Circuit, Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit, there are district
court opinions supporting selective waiver. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, dated July 13, 1979, the district court held that a privileged report
turned over as part of cooperation with the SEC and to the Internal
Revenue Service, did not waive the attorney-client privilege.2 45 In
Texas, a district court prevented class action discovery of documents that
2 46
had been turned over to the SEC in In re LTV Securities Litigation.
The Northern District of California has also adopted the Teachers'
Insurance approach in Fox v. CaliforniaSierraFinancialServices.24 7
D. CongressionalActions
1. Proposed Rule 502
On May 15, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502.248 The Rule addresses a number
of problems with the current federal common law governing the waiver
of attorney-client privilege and work product. The proposed Rule 502
addresses the scope of the waiver, inadvertent disclosure, selective
waiver, controlling effect of court orders, controlling effect of party
agreements, and a definition of attorney-client privilege and work product as used in the Rule. With respect to selective waiver, however, the
standing Committee unanimously agreed that a provision on selective
waiver should be included in any proposed rule released for public comment but should be placed in brackets to indicate that the Committee has
not yet determined whether a provision on selective waiver should be
sent to Congress. 249 The standing Committee recognized that any rule
prepared by the Advisory Committee should proceed through the rulemaking process, but it would have to eventually be enacted directly by
Congress as it would be a rule affecting privileges.250 The proposed Rule
502, which the standing Committee has not yet determined to send to
Congress with respect to selective waiver would provide:

244. Id. at 646.
245.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (D. Wis. 1979).
246. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 605 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
247. Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
248. Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith, Chairman of the Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chairman of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure I (May 15, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/reports/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id. at 9; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2006).
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[(c) Selective Waiver. - In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection - when made to a
federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority - does not operate as a waiver of
the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or
entities. The effect of disclosure to a state or local government
agency, with respect to non-governmental persons or entities, is governed by applicable state law. Nothing in this rule limits or expands
the authority of a government agency to disclose communications or
information to other25government
agencies or as otherwise authorized
1
or required by law.]

2. Proposed Legislation
On the last day of the 109th Congress, Second Session, Senator
Arlen Specter introduced a bill titled the "Attomey-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006."152 If enacted, the Act would prohibit consideration
of waiver of privilege; prohibit conditioning treatment on waiver; protect
corporations paying attorneys fees of individuals, joint defense agreements and sharing information with employees. 3
VI. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION

The Qwest case involved issues of waiver of attorney-client privilege and non-opinion work-product documents.2 54 Like the Second Circuit in Steinhardt Partnersand several other courts that have addressed
selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit did not adopt a per se rule against
selective waiver.25 5
The Tenth Circuit, placing heavy emphasis on the state of the record
before it, declined to expand the testimonial exclusionary rules of attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.25 6 After discussing the
facts and analyzing the law as discussed above, the court's conclusion
251.
Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith, supra note 248, at 5-6. The proposed
Rule 502 was sent out for public comment in August 2006. Notice from David F. Levi, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, To The Bench,
Bar and Public 1 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Memo Bench Bar
andPublic 2006.pdf. The process for consideration and promulgation of the Rule if enacted will
likely take several years. See JAMES C. DUFF, THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for The Bench and
The Bar (Apr. 2006), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm.
252.
S.30, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), availableat http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/
thompsonmemoleg.pdf.
253.
Id.
254.
In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 584 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006) 1.
255.
See Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 230; Delwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d
1122 (7th Cir. 1997) (addressing law enforcement investigatory privilege but applying the same
analysis); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d
at 1371-72.
256.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195.
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under the heading "No Selective Waiver in This Case" states, "For the
reasons discussed above, the record in this case does not justify adoption
of selective waiver., 257 The court made a reference to a deficient record
on at least ten occasions:
e We conclude the record in this case is not sufficient to justify
adoption of a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the general
rules of waiver upon disclosure of protected material.258
o The record does not establish a need for a rule of selective waiver
to assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the purposes
of the attorney-client privilege and2 59work-product doctrine, or to avoid
unfairness to the disclosing party.
* On this record "[W]e are unwilling to embark the judiciary
on a
260

long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination."

e The record before us, however, does not support the contention
that companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent
protection under the selective waiver doctrine. Most telling is
Qwest's disclosure of 220,000 pages of protected materials knowing
the Securities Case was pending, in the face of almost unanimous circuit-court rejection of selective waiver in similar
circumstances, and
261
despite the absence of Tenth Circuit precedent.
The record is equally deficient concerning whether the DOJ and
the SEC may have independently gained access to the Waiver Documents by invoking other means or theories,
such as the crime or fraud
262
exception to the attorney-client privilege.
e

* The record does not support reliance on the Qwest agreements

with the SEC and the DOJ to justify selective waiver. The agreements do little to restrict the agencies' use of the materials they received from Qwest.263
* The record does not indicate whether Qwest negotiated or could
have negotiated for more protection for the Waiver Documents, or
whether, as it asserted at oral argument, seeking further restrictions
264
would have so diluted its cooperation to render it valueless.
* The concession highlights a further record deficiency:

the nature
and severity of the burden placed upon the district court to sort
through all 220,000 pages of Waiver Documents to determine what
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1201.
Id.at 1192.
Id.
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972)).
Id.
at 1193.
Id.
Id. at 1194.
Id.
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use the government made of each document, and whether any further
disclosure
had vitiated an otherwise applicable privilege or protec26 5
tion.
* The record in this case does not indicate that the proposed excep-

tion would promote the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege or
266
work product doctrine.
* As discussed above, the record is silent on whether selective
267
waiver truly is necessary to achieve cooperation.

Some of the circuit courts that have declined to follow Diversified
have noted that, in doing so, they are not adopting a per se rule.268 The
Tenth Circuit also falls into this category. In doing so, the courts are
preserving the ability to craft rules relating to privilege on a case-by-case
basis as recognized in Federal Rules of Evidence 501 ("FRE 501") and
the Supreme Court in Upjohn.269 FRE 501 was substituted by Congress
for a proposed set of privilege rules drafted by The Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and approved by The Judicial
Conference of The United States and by the Supreme Court. 270 Avoiding
any per se rule is consistent with FRE 501 and the Advisory Committee
Notes, which state that the rule "reflect[s] the view that the recognition
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges
should be determined on a case by case basis. 271' FRE 501 manifests a
desire to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case-by-case basis.272
The Tenth Circuit, while acknowledging its power under FRE 501,
made it clear that, under the facts of the case, it saw no compelling reason to adopt a selective waiver rule on privilege.273 Granted, Qwest had
entered into written confidentiality agreements with the government
agencies.2 74 The First, Second, Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have, in declining to adopt a per se rule, indicated a written confidentiality agreement may have been considered in allowing some selective waiver under certain circumstances. But, each of those courts de-

265.

Id.

266.

Id. at 1195.

267.

Id. at 1196.

268.

See, e.g., SteinhardtPartners,9 F.3d at 236.

269.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445

U.S. 40,46 (1980).
270.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46.
271.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1184 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
272.
Id.
273. Id. at 1192.
274. Id. at 1181.
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clined any selective waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product
under their particular case.275
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found the circumstances in Qwest merited no allowance of selective waiver. It appeared to be the breadth of
the disclosure; the excessive use of the documents in other state criminal
proceedings and agency actions; the knowledge of existing civil suits at
the time of disclosure; the lack of any of solid precedence, all of which
persuaded the Tenth Circuit, on this record, to decline to adopt selective
waiver. 276 The Tenth Circuit also noted that, if selective waiver was essential to government operations, the agencies should have supported
Qwest's request; however, they did not.277
VII. SELECTIVE WAIVER GOING FORWARD
Although the Sixth Circuit characterized the state of the law of limited waiver as a state of "hopeless confusion, ,,278 the reality is that no
corporation in the past two decades could have turned over privileged
documents or work product documents to the DOJ, SEC or any other
"adversary" agency without knowing that said decision may indeed result in a full waiver of the privilege, including to civil litigants.
The Sixth Circuit carefully segregated the law of selective waiver
into cases in which selective waiver is allowed-(the Eighth Circuit
stands alone); selective waiver is never allowed; and selective waiver
might be allowed. 279 But in reality, with the exception of the Eighth Circuit, each of the circuit courts refused to allow selective waiver under the
facts presented in each case. The various circuit courts' passing references to the possibility of some factual situation in the future wherein
privileged documents are turned over but no full waiver is found, is more
an adherence to FRE 501 than a state of hopeless confusion of the law of
selective waiver. FRE 501 leaves interpretation of privilege up to the
courts, applying common law.
Notwithstanding lack of any supportive precedence, as the abovediscussed case law demonstrates, many corporations chose to make the
decision to turn over privileged materials to government agencies. Under the current state of the law, that decision must involve careful consideration, weighing the merits of handing over privileged documents to
the government, either because they demonstrated that the company was
not guilty of wrongdoing or because the corporation determines that get275.
In re The Leslie Fay Companies Inc. Sec. Lit., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1127; United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (istCir. 1995);
Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 824.
276.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193-94.
277.
Id. at 1193.
278.
In re Columbia HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 2945 (6th

Cit. 2002).
279.

Id. at 295-302.
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ting leniency from the government is important enough that the corporation would risk waiving the privilege and deal with the consequences of
waiver in subsequent civil litigation. That decision-making process is a
process worth preserving. As discussed above, a new proposed Rule 502
has been drafted and circulated by the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure.28 ° So, the question is why do we need a new rule; what
will the rule really add?
The rule will make the corporation's consideration and decision easier. A corporation would be able to waive the privilege and not risk having those documents disclosed in subsequent civil litigation. But what
does this really do for the attorney-client privilege? The attorney-client
privilege is the "bastion of ordered liberty.",281 Its purpose is not to facilitate government investigations, but rather to encourage full and frank
discussions between an attorney and his or her client to get to the truth so
that the lawyer can best represent the client. It has been suggested that
half of a privilege is not worth having at all. 282 And, indeed, it is appropriate that there be some concern over whether the proposed Rule 502
will have an adverse impact on the attorney-client privilege when a corporation tries to gather facts in an internal investigation.
Indeed, when Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty made remarks at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference on December 12, 2006, he acknowledged that there must be integrity in what a
company does when investigating misconduct and that to do the job
right: "[C]orporate attorneys have told me that they need full and frank
communication between attorney and employee if they are expected to
steer conduct
away from law breaking or uncover criminal wrongdo283
ing"
When an individual discusses the internal affairs of a corporation
with inside counsel, the hope is that they will always be frank and candid. But United States Attorney James B. Comey candidly revealed that
turnover of privileged internal investigations of a corporation may be the
only way that the government can get statements of individuals due to
the Fifth Amendment.284 From employees' point of view, they may be
more willing to discuss matters candidly when they are armed with the
knowledge that a corporation will have to carefully consider all of the
consequences of waiving the privilege, including the possibility the privilege is waived in full.

280.

See supra note 248.

281.
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN,
DOCTRINE 1, 2 (4th ed. 2001).

THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT

282.
Collin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is Half-Privilege Worth Having at All, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2006).
283.
McNulty Memorandum, supranote 117.
284.
Interview with US. Att. James B. Comey, U.S. ATr'Ys BULL., November 2003, at 4.
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Despite radical changes in Section VII of the McNulty Memorandum, it is not likely to have much impact on corporations' waiver of
privilege. This is so because although the fact that the McNulty Memorandum expressly states that prosecutors must not use a corporation's
declination against the corporation in making charging decisions, it nonetheless provides that "prosecutors may always favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence to the government's waiver request in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's investigacroain
*,,285
Most corporations waive the privilege in hopes of getting favortion.
able treatment. For similar reasons, the proposed Rule 502, while it may
indeed facilitate corporations' cooperation in government investigations,
is not likely to have a favorable impact on the attorney-client privilege
itself.
With proposed Rule 502, corporations could certainly undertake the
kind of analysis discussed above. Or, corporations could choose to turn
over privilege documents to plead for leniency, knowing there will be
fewer consequences in later civil litigation. This could have an impact
on the individuals whose statements helped the corporation get favorable
consideration, at their personal expense. In the long-run, this may have
an adverse impact on the privilege because individuals will stop communicating.
If a corporation has to weigh the risks of waiving the privilege to
the government in full, meaning accepting all the consequences including
that the information may be available in civil litigation, this simply
makes the decision to waive the privilege more calculated. Knowing that
the corporation can waive the privilege without having to consider the
consequences of that waiver in other arenas, such as civil litigation,
could make employees uneasy about discussing matters with their
in-house counsel. Employees do not want to become the chip the corporation uses with the government. Proposed Rule 502 undermines the
gravity of a corporation's decision to waive the privilege. That decision
should never be made lightly given the importance of the privilege in
common law.
While the Rules Committee has not determined whether to submit
proposed Rule 502(c) to Congress, such a Congressional change to the
privilege is what Andrew McNally argues for in his article Revitalizing
Selective Waiver.286 Mr. McNally appropriately points out that selective
waiver encourages corporate cooperation with government investigai
287
tions, which isindeed a laudable goal. But he candidly admits there is
that selective waiver will further the goals and purfor
arguing
no case

285.

McNulty Memorandum, supra note 117, § 2.

286.

See generally McNally, supra note 8.

287.

at 826.
See id.
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poses of the attorney-client privilege itself.288 Nothing has prevented
corporations from waiving the privilege, after weighing all of the consequences, in each of the cases discussed above. No doubt, even without a
rule, selective waiver and government disclosures are likely to continue.
But, no doubt some corporations have refused to waive the privilege
despite pressure from the government after considering the consequences
and possible disclosure of that information in subsequent civil litigation.
In Stein, the district court found that the Thompson Memorandum, as
invoked by the United States Attorney's Office, caused KPMG to consider departing from its longstanding policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel. 289 KPMG was extremely anxious to curry favor
with the USAO by demonstrating how cooperative it could be.29 °
At the time, the Thompson Memorandum expressly identified willingness to waive the privilege as a factor to be considered in whether a
corporation is being cooperative. The McNulty Memorandum does not
change this, but does say a corporation cannot be penalized for not waiving the privilege. With a new selective disclosure rule approved by Congress, corporations will be hard pressed to justify their refusal to waive
the privilege to the government. And, for this reason alone, it seems that
the proposed rule undermines the privilege. The government may consider it a right once a corporation does not have to consider the consequences of further disclosure to third parties, for example in civil litigation.
The privilege is too important a bastion of the common law and too
critical to an attorney's ability to represent his or her client to risk undermining it with a rule that is unnecessary given the last two decades
wherein hundreds of corporations have waived the privilege and participated in voluntary cooperation with government agencies.
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See id. at 857.
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.

